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Abstract: In this paper we look at the Turkish reform process with regard to the 
Kurdish minority from the perspective of Europeaniztion and in the light of the 
external incentives model. As a result, the paper provides a systematic analysis of 
recent political developments in this area. Additionally, our analysis leads to the 
questioning of some basic premises of the external i centives model. Most 
notably in this specific case we find that credible EU commitment, rather than low 
adoption costs and weak veto players, has constituted a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the reform process. Likewise, we find a dynamic relationship 
between EU induced democratic reforms and adoption c sts that is largely 
overlooked in the model. 
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Turkish accession has been on Europe's political agenda since 1963 when the 
country first became an associate member to the European Economic Community. 
Turkey achieved the formal candidate status to the EU only in 1999 and the 
accession negotiations with this country were opened i  2005. Nevertheless, soon 
after the negotiations faced a stalemate, due to the accession of Cyprus to the EU 
as a divided island as well as the increasing scepticism of some EU Member 
States with regard to Turkish accession. In the short time that had passed between 
the recognition of Turkey’s candidateship and the stagnation in accession talks, 
Turkey adopted far-reaching democratic reforms, including reforms regarding its 
Kurdish minority. This latter issue in particular had been a political taboo in the 
country since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. However, the 
initially promising reform process came to a sudden halt, coinciding with the 
stalemate in Turkish-EU accession talks.  
In this paper we study Turkey’s democratic reform process with regard to the 
Kurdish minority, specifically from the perspective of Europeanization and in the 
light of the external incentives model. As a result of his analysis, we argue that 
the Turkish government adopted the initial reforms in the presence of strong and 
credible commitment by the EU to Turkish accession, thus, strong democratic 
conditionality. This was in spite of the high adopti n costs and the presence of 
strong domestic veto players that the Turkish governm nt faced at the time. Yet, 
once the EU’s credible commitment declined with thestagnation in accession 
talks, the reform process also slowed considerably despite a continuous, 
significant decrease in adoption costs as well as a we kening of domestic veto 
players. Thus, in this paper we provide a systematic analysis of recent political 
developments in Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish minority. Additionally, we 
question some of the basic premises of the external incentives model. Crucially, 
supporters of the model have argued that low adoption costs and weak veto 
players constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for democratic reforms in 
EU accession countries. Our analysis proves otherwis : in Turkish democratic 
reforms with regard to the treatment of Kurds credible EU commitment appears as 
a sufficient and necessary condition, whereas low adoption costs and weak veto 
players appear as neither necessary nor sufficient onditions. Additionally we find 
a dynamic relationship between the adoption costs and the EU conditionality, as 
the adoption costs decrease progressively as a result of EU induced democratic 
reforms. This dynamic relationship is overlooked in the external incentives model. 
Naturally, our findings are limited to this specifi case and need to be verified by 
comparative analysis of democratic reforms with rega d to minorities in other EU 
accession countries and countries that have recently become EU members.   
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The paper is structured as follows: to start, we discuss the existing 
Europeanization literature in general and the external incentives model in 
particular with an emphasis on the principle of conditionality that underlies the 
EU accession strategy. Following this, we look specifically into the issue of 
minority protection and its position in the EU’s legal framework as well as its role 
in accession negotiations. Afterwards, we study the Turkish democratic reforms 
with regard to the Kurdish minority in two historical phases reflecting the 
episodes in Turkish-EU relations and the resulting effects on EU conditionality. 
This is followed by a short conclusion where we summarise our findings 
regarding the external incentives model, the democratic eform process in Turkey 
as well as the future research challenges in these areas.   
 
Europeanization, EU democratic conditionality and the external incentives 
model 
Europeanization is a broad concept that encapsulate th  transformation of 
domestic norms, policies and structures under direct and/or indirect pressures 
emanating from the EU (Featherstone 2009). Although a certain level of 
convergence between different domestic regimes is expected to emerge as a result 
of Europeanization, it is not equal to harmonisation: Europeanization is not only 
about the outcome but it concerns the domestic adapt tion process and its 
underlying dynamics (Radaelli 2003; Vink, Graziano2008). In the early literature 
it was emphasised that for domestic adaptation to take place, there should be a 
priori  a ‘misfit’ between domestic norms, structures and policies on the one hand 
and those of the EU on the other resulting in a pressure for adaptation (Börzel, 
Risse 2000; 2009). In the existence of this misfit, the process of adaptation is 
explained through two principal models:  the first model, ‘logic of 
consequentialism’, relies on rational institutionalism. According to this model, 
actors are goal oriented and will respond to opportunities that maximise their 
utilities. Here Europeanization constitutes an ‘opprtunity structure’ that increases 
the resources of certain actors to exert influence, whilst limiting those of others 
(March, Olsen 1989; 1998; Börzel, Risse 2000; 2009).The latter model, ‘logic of 
appropriateness’, relies on social institutionalism. Here it is argued that actors 
who interact with each other on a regular basis will develop similar norm and 
belief systems. Likewise, actors who desire to be a member of an international 
society or organisation will internalize the norms promoted by the society or 
organisation in question (March and Olsen 1989; 1998; Börzel, Risse 2000; 2009). 
This model, therefore, perceives the social interaction process between domestic 
and international actors as the key factor underlying domestic adaptation. 
Although based on different reasonings, the two models are not seen as competing 
explanations for domestic adaption but could occur simultaneously.  
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More recent research into Europeanization has also t ckled the effects of the EU 
accession process on the economic and political transformation of central and 
eastern European countries (CEECs) that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 
respectively – as well as the current candidates, including Turkey. The concept of 
‘conditionality’ plays a key role in the explanation of pre-accession 
transformation that takes place in these countries. Conditionality originally 
emerged as a concept of international studies in the post World War II period as 
an explanation of the relationship between internatio l organisations and 
underdeveloped countries. The concept assumes an asymmetrical power 
relationship between a donor and a recipient, in which the donor attaches certain 
conditions to the release of financial assistance or other rewards that would serve 
the policy goals promoted by the donor. Alternatively the donor might also have 
the power to impose sanctions in cases of non-compliance, attributing 
conditionality both a positive and a negative power connotation (Grabbe 2009; 
Hughes et. al. 2004; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2005). 
The past and on-going enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe is 
particularly interesting due to the existence of a strong conditionality principle. In 
1993, the European Council decided that any country that wishes to become an 
EU member must achieve ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of 
a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union’(the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’, 
see European Council Conclusions 1993, p.13). In other words, compared to the 
past, in the recent enlargements candidates have faced  greater pressure for 
change and they have been asked to adopt a larger number of substantive rules 
and policies (Grabbe 2009). Similarly, candidates have not been given the 
flexibility to negotiate any opt-outs meaning that they have been obliged to adopt 
the entire acquis prior to accession. This stronger and extensive conditi nality 
partially stemmed from the continuous expansion of the EU’s internal legal 
framework. Another key objective was the avoidance of any potential 
impediments to EU economic and security interests that may occur as a result of 
the CEECs’ future membership(Hughes et. al. 2004; Sasse 2009a). In comparison 
to the CEECs, Turkey enjoyed a relatively established parliamentary democracy 
and a liberal market economy, thus, was not going through a similarly radical 
process of economic and legal transformation. Nevertheless, Turkish EU 
membership was also made conditional on the satisfaction of Copenhagen criteria, 
due to Turkey’s very own political and cultural idiosyncrasies that raised 
questions from the perspective of European identity. Based on the Copenhagen 
criteria and following European Commission recommendations, the European 
Council has determined individual short- and medium-term objectives for each 
candidate country. The Commission has closely monitored candidates’ 
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compliance with those objectives in its annual progress reports. This assessment 
has provided the main feedback for European Council de isions to open accession 
negotiations with candidates as well as eventual decisions of admission to EU 
membership.  
Studies of Europeanization have attempted to explain the domestic adaptation 
process in EU candidate countries focusing specifically on the incentives and 
dynamics that underlie the effects of EU conditionality. After empirical testing of 
recent accessions, those studies developed three key models that represent 
nuanced versions of the aforementioned ‘logic of consequentialism’ and ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ models. 
The ‘external incentives’ model follows rational choice institutionalism, 
overlapping largely with the logic of consequentialism. In this model, EU 
conditionality plays the key role in inducing domestic adaptation. The Union 
determines adoption of certain norms as conditions for the release of certain 
rewards (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2005). Intermediat  institutional rewards 
include adoption of trade agreements, whereas admission to EU Membership 
constitutes the ultimate institutional reward. Rewards may also be financial in 
nature (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2005). Notably, the release of structural 
funds and financial aid from PHARE1 has been made conditional upon the 
satisfaction of short- and medium-term objectives by the candidate countries. In 
external incentives model two key factors underlie th  domestic adaptation 
process: for domestic adaptation to take place, first there must be ‘credible 
commitment’ to membership. In other words, the EU must realistically be able to 
produce the promised rewards, including membership, w th little or no cost to 
itself once the candidate fulfils the conditions. The EU must equally be able to 
withhold the reward if the conditions are not fulfilled. Secondly, domestic 
adoption costs must not be prohibitively high for those in power in the candidate 
countries or else change will not take place. For instance, if the adoption of 
reforms may result in a future electoral defeat, political incumbents may naturally 
be unwilling to adopt the requested reforms. Domestic ‘veto players’, who enjoy 
political or other powers to block the process, constitute a particularly important 
adoption cost (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig 2009). Recent 
empirical studies discredited the relevance of other factors, such as the size of the 
                                                           
1 The Phare (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) was created in 
1989 specifically to provide financial assistance to Poland and Hungary. However, in time the 
programme became a key pre-accession instrument financed by the European Union to assist the 





reward and the determinacy of conditions, although these were originally seen as 
other necessary conditions for domestic adaptation (Schimmelfenning, Sedelmeier 
2005, p.12; Schimmelfennig et. al. 2005, p.29).   
The remaining two models, ‘social learning’ and ‘lesson drawing’, draw on social 
institutionalism, thereby overlapping largely with t e ‘logic of appropriateness’. 
In the former model, domestic political actors adopt the requested norms because 
they come to believe in the superiority and legitimacy of the norm as a result of 
interactions with EU-level actors. (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004; 2008; 
2009). In the latter model, domestic actors adopt the rules, because they are 
endogenously dissatisfied with the status quo and look for alternative options. 
Domestic change agents and epistemic communities who believe in the 
superiority of norms promoted by the EU reinforce the adaptation process 
(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004; 2008; 2009). In the social learning model in 
particular, the legitimacy of the norm in question plays a substantial role. Since 
the candidate countries do not participate in EU policymaking procedures, 
domestic political actors as well as society in general may perceive the conditions 
attached to EU membership as foreign impositions (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 
2009). Therefore, particularly if the norm in question conflicts with the 
established domestic norms and belief systems, the EU institutions need to 
promote the legitimacy of the norm through social interaction, networking and 
civil society support. By the same token, norms that are not shared by the existing 
EU member states but made a condition for the candid tes will suffer from low 
legitimacy (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2009).  
Similar to the logic of consequences and appropriateness, these two models are 
not alternatives but may be at work at the same tim. Empirical and comparative 
studies have tested the models in the context of EU’s eastern enlargement process 
as well as the on-going accession negotiations with Turkey. Those studies 
distinguish between the analysis of democratic conditionality that largely 
corresponds to the Copenhagen political criteria(i.e. ‘stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection 
of minorities’) from the analysis of acquis conditionality. The distinction is made 
primarily because in the context of acquis conditionality the EU legal framework 
provides established and clear rules that are expected to result in high determinacy 
and legitimacy in EU conditionality. The same cannot be said for democratic 
conditionality. The aforementioned studies come to the conclusion that 
particularly in the area of democratic conditionality the external incentives model 
explains domestic adaptations best. Methods based on networking, social 
interaction and civil society support results in, if any, incremental changes 
(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004;2005; 2008; Schimmelfennig et. al. 
2003;2005). Likewise, the legitimacy of the norm in question does not have any 
visible effect on its adoption (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004). It is further 
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argued that low adoption costs and the absence (or weakness) of domestic veto 
players constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for rule adoption, whereas 
credible commitment is considered a necessary but not sufficient condition 
(Schimmelfennig et. al. 2005; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004). Naturally this 
finding is alarming, as it implies a potential return to the status quo ante once the 
candidates become EU members and thus the power of conditionality vanishes. 
Initial studies looking at compliance with EU norms post-enlargement have found 
that this pessimistic hypothesis has not materialised, and the new EU Member 
States outperformed the original fifteen in their compliance with EU law 
(Sedelmeier 2009). However these initial analyses focus largely on the 
transposition of EU directives into national law and the Commission’s 
infringement proceedings, rather than the internalisation of EU norms by domestic 
political actors and their implementation (or reversal) in the longer term. 
The external incentives model is criticised for two key reasons: first, the model 
perceives EU accession and the domestic transformation process as one-
directional, static processes based on linear causality. Notably, the model does not 
pay any attention to political forces that may be at work at the domestic level as 
alternative sources of explanation (Vink, Graziano 2008; Hughes et. al. 2004; 
Sasse 2009a). Second, the model focuses almost exclusively on rule adoption, 
thus, overlooking the implementation and internalisation of the rule by domestic 
actors in the long run. It is argued that, although external incentives alone may 
explain rule adoption, creating a belief in the legitimacy of the rule through 
networking, socialisation and civil society mobilisation may have over time a 
greater impact on sustained and consistent rule enforcement (Epstein, Sedelmeier 
2009; Sedelmeier 2009).   
 
Minority protection in the context of EU democratic conditionality 
The broadly defined Copenhagen criteria resulted in a great EU influence on the 
political and economic dynamics in candidate countries going beyond the EU 
influence on existing Member States under the EU internal legal framework. This 
is particularly the case for minority protection. 
The EU internal legal framework does not offer an established norm of minority 
protection. Given that the EU’s predecessors had pursued the primary objective of 
economic – rather than political – integration, the EU originally held neither legal 
competence nor political interest in minority protection (Toggenburg 2000; 2006; 
Riedel 2009; Sadurski 2004). Instead, what exists in the EU legal framework is a 
strong principle of non-discrimination based on thekey objective of economic 
integration and the freedom of movement. This principle imposes a negative 
obligation on the Member States and individuals to refrain from discrimination on 
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the basis of nationality, rather than a positive obligation to promote minority and 
cultural rights. The inclusion of minority protection in the Copenhagen criteria, 
despite the lack of a codified EU norm, was largely due to the EU’s own security 
interests shaped by the complex post-communist transi io  process and the 
resulting ethnic conflicts, most prominently in former Yugoslavia (Sasse 2009a; 
2009b). The Amsterdam Treaty transposed the Copenhag  criteria into EU 
primary law in Arts.6 and 49 of the TEU. These provisions deal respectively with 
the values and principles of the Union and the conditions for joining the Union, 
omitting – interestingly – the principle of minority protection. Although a 
reference is made to discrimination i ter alia on the basis of ethnic origin in 
Art.19 TFEU (ex Art.13 TEC), this is, again, a negative rule of non-discrimination 
rather than positive promotion of minority rights. Moreover, the provision does 
not have direct effect but relies on further EU legislative actions to achieve the 
objectives specified within it.  
After the Lisbon Treaty amendments, Art.2 TEU refers inter alia to ‘respect […] 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities’ among the values of the Union. 
Likewise, the Charter of Fundamental Rights Art.21, that now enjoys the status of 
EU primary law, prohibits discrimination on the basis of ‘membership of a 
national minority’. These are open-ended provisions whose exact scope and real 
practical effect very much depend on the interpretation of the EU courts (Sadurski 
2004). Again, the latter provision in particular sets out a negative rule of non-
discrimination rather than a positive obligation for the protection and promotion 
of minorities. Similarly, recent EU legislation, most notably the so-called ‘Race 
Directive’ (Council Directive 2000/43/EC), extends the existing EU principle of 
non-discrimination to discrimination on the basis of ethnic background, including 
in cases where the subject is a third country natiol, without recognising a 
positive obligation on the side of the Member States to promote cultural and 
minority rights.  
In the lack of a minority protection rule in its internal legal framework, the EU has 
relied extensively on rules developed by other organizations, in particular the 
Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE).For instance, in the Commission’s Agenda 2000, which defined 
the EU’s goals for the twenty-first century, referenc s were made to the CoE’s 
1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the 
Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE on an 
additional protocol on the rights of national minorities. Also, EU candidates were 
called to sign and implement these documents in individual accession partnerships 
as well as the Commission’s various progress reports. The 2001 Joint Declaration 
on the partnership between the CoE and the European Commission explicitly 
emphasised cooperation in the area of minority protection. Likewise, the EU 
relied on the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities in the 
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assessment and promotion of minority protection in the EU accession countries. 
This was despite the fact that a number of existing EU Member States, such as 
Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg, were not a party to he 1995 Convention at the 
time. It should be pointed out that Recommendation 1201 has remained a guiding 
document rather than an additional binding protocol to the European Convention 
of Human Rights, specifically because members of the CoE remained reluctant to 
sign to a binding norm of minority protection. Thus, the accession countries have 
been asked to meet a higher standard of minority protection than the existing 
Member States whose national legal rules in this area remained diverse (Wiener, 
Schwellnus 2004). Consequently, the EU’s approach to minority protection in 
internal vis-à-vis the external framework was considered a ‘double standard’ and a 
political, rather than a legal, construct (de Witte 2000; Sasse 2009a; 2009b; 
Sadurski 2004).  
In the absence of clear norms and benchmarks in the EU internal legal order, the 
condition of minority protection was applied inconsistently over time and across 
different accession countries (Schwellnus 2005; Toggenburg 2006). For instance, 
despite the prominent position of minority issues in the enlargement agenda, the 
EU institutions did not define the term ‘minority’.  Later, in the context of the 
European employment strategy and the process of social in lusion, minority was 
defined as a group having stable ethnic, linguistic or religious characteristics that 
are different from the rest of the population, as well as a numerical minority 
position and the wish to preserve its own separate identity (European Commission 
Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 
2007). Another reason for the ad hoc-ery, in which minority protection was 
addressed in accession negotiations, was the Union’s specific security interests. 
The Reflection Group on Long-Term Implications of EU nlargement identified 
three main challenges that the EU may have to face post-enlargement in terms of 
minorities: the situation of national minorities already existing in the CEECs; 
potential migration from new and poorer Member States as well as their 
neighbouring third countries to Western Europe; andfi ally, the situation of the 
Roma (Reflection Group Report 1999). Consequently, minority condition was 
applied with a varying magnitude for each individual country depending on 
whether or not the situation proved problematic from these perspectives. Over 
time, the Commission’s approach to minority issues b came more technical and 
less political (Pridham 2002). The focus remained consistently on the situation of 
the Russophones in Estonia and Latvia and the situation of the Roma particularly 
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania ad Slovakia (Sasse 2009b, 
p.22). The Commission followed a ‘thin approach’ in how it addressed minority 
issues rejecting strongly the right of self-determination and secession, instead 
promoting the symbiotic existence of different ethnic groups (Noutcheva et. al. 
2004; Wiener and Schwellnus 2004). Additionally, since minority protection 
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conflicted with the emerging national identities in post-communist transition and 
it suffered from low legitimacy in the lack of an established EU norm, the 
Commission moved carefully in this area in order not to alienate the political 
actors in accession countries. As the candidates becam  EU Member States with 
the 2004 and 2007enlargements, the focus shifted from old to new minorities 
emerging as a result of intra-EU migration; and from minority protection to non-
discrimination in line with the EU internal legal framework (Toggenburg 2006; 
Riedel 2009; Wiener and Schwellnus 2004).   
 
Turkish-EU Relations and the Kurdish Question: from Ankara to Brussels 
via Diyarbakır  
Similar to other minority conflicts, Turkey’s Kurdish question is multi-facetted. 
The fundamental issue from the legal perspective is the Turkish constitutional 
regime and Turkey’s past and present constitutions. After the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire the Turkish constitutional regime aimed at creating a unified 
nation based on Turkishness, thus, rejecting other cultural identities (Kurban 2003; 
Ergil 2000; Aydın, Keyman 2004; Kirişçi, Gareth 1997). This is reflected in many 
references of the Constitution to the Turkish identity, including Art.3 that 
identifies Turkish as the language of the State andthat, moreover, cannot be 
amended (see Art.4). The Turkish State had followed other policies of rejection 
since its establishment in 1923, including prohibiting the use of languages other 
than Turkish,2 prohibiting the naming of children with non-Turkish names and the 
changing of geographical names to Turkish (Kurban 2003; TESEV 2008; 2010; 
Kiri şçi and Gareth 1997).  
The Turkish State takes the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 as the defining text of 
its official minority policy. Based on religion, the Treaty identifies three groups, 
Jews, Greeks and Armenians (the so-called ‘non-Moslem ’) as minorities of 
Turkey and grants them certain rights and privileges, such as education in their 
mother tongue. This State policy prevents the access of minority groups in Turkey 
to effective protection standards: on the one hand, groups other than those 
identified in the Treaty are not considered a minority per se; on the other hand, the 
Treaty is accepted to set the absolute protection sta dard for the minorities as 
identified in the Treaty (Oran 2004). This is despite the fact that the Treaty falls 
behind the contemporary international standards of minority protection that began 
to emerge in the post World War II period. 
In addition to the rejection of minority status from the legal perspective, the armed 
conflict between the Turkish military forces and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ 
                                                           
2 This prohibition was finally abolished in 1991. 
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Party – which now appears in the EU list of terrorist organizations3), in the 
predominantly Kurdish populated Southeast Turkey renders the Kurdish issue 
multi-dimensional: among others, there is a strong human rights dimension due to 
the disproportionate use of power by the State particularly under the emergency 
rule that had given extraordinary powers to the State and the governor; there is a 
regional injustice dimension due to economic backwardness of Southeast Turkey; 
there are significant sociological effects of State induced emigration, such as 
emergence of ethnic cleavages and conflicts in neighbouring regions as well as 
metropolitan areas; there is a gender dimension due to the particularly low respect 
for women rights in Southeast Turkey as a result of general economic 
backwardness (TESEV 2008; 2010).     
Although the EU is generally blamed for not fully grasping the dynamics of 
minority issues in accession countries, in the Turkish case different dimensions of 
the Kurdish issue have been subjected to conditionality. In contrast to the CEECs, 
the conditionality relationship between the EU and Turkey was established long 
before the recent enlargements with the signing of the Ankara Association 
Agreement in 1963. The Association Agreement would eventually result in 
Turkey’s full membership after the preparatory, transitional and final stages. In 
the half century that passed since the signing of the Agreement, the situation of 
the Kurdish minority has been perceived by the EU as a hurdle to the achievement 
of this goal. For instance, in its 1989 Opinion, responding to Turkey’s application 
for full membership, the Commission referred to the Kurdish issue as one of the 
key reasons why accession negotiations should not start at that point (European 
Commission 1989). Likewise, the European Parliament adopted numerous 
resolutions on the matter and imposed even financial sanctions on Turkey 
(Müftüler-Baç 2000; Casier 2011). The European Commission’s very first 
progress report on Turkey placed the Kurdish issue at the core of the entire 
assessment of compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. According to the 
report, Kurdish issue called for ‘a civil and not a military solution’ (European 
Commission 1998). The existing military approach based on the perception of 
Kurdish issue as a security threat resulted in an overall weak status of human 
rights and the rule of law in the country, thus, resulting in non-compliance with 
the Copenhagen criteria in general (European Commission 1998). In the following 
years the Commission’s progress reports became moretechnical and detailed. In 
the reports the Kurdish issue has continuously been addressed from multiple 
angles, including the judicial approach pointing to the status of human rights, civil 
and political rights, economic and social rights and cultural rights as well as 
minority rights. This stood in strong contrast to the superficial and inconsistent 
                                                           
3 Council Common Position 2009/67/CFSPof 26 January 2009updating Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing 
Common Position 2008/586/CFSP, [2009] OJ L 23/37.  
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treatment of the other Muslim and non-Muslim minorities, whose religious, 
linguistic and property rights were addressed in some reports but neglected in 
others. This exceptional treatment of the Kurdish question was attributed to the 
intensive lobbying and networking activities of the Kurdish diaspora in Western 
Europe, and their success in voicing claims and demands in the discourse of 
western democratic values and human rights norms (Ca ier 2011; 2010). Another 
source of explanation is the potential security threat raised by Turkey’s future EU 
membership in the presence of armed conflict that still surrounds the Kurdish 
issue. The latter explanation appears also in line with the general treatment of 
minority issues in the accession agenda, as summarised in the previous section. 
The early attempts to enforce conditionality did not result in any meaningful 
change, arguably due to the lack of a clear prospect for the start of accession 
negotiations, i.e. the lack of credible commitment. The EU was able to secure 
only incremental results at important decisional junct res. For instance, the 
European Parliament’s unfavourable opinion before the signing of the customs 
union agreement between Turkey and the European Communities in 1994 resulted 
in incremental amendments to the Constitution and the Anti-Terror Law 
(Müftüler-Baç 2000; 2005; Çelik, Rumelili 2006). The EU was able to secure 
leverage over the Turkish political regime only after the recognition of Turkey as 
an EU candidate by the 1999 Helsinki Council (European Council, 1999). The 
decision of the Council is perceived as a hallmark in Turkish-EU relations due to 
the significant improvement in credible commitment to Turkey’s EU membership, 
and the resulting improvement in EU conditionality (Müftüler-Baç 2000; 2005; 
Öniş 2003; Aydın, Keyman 2004; Keyman, Öniş 2004; Kubicek 2005; 2011; 
Tocci, 2005; Kirişçi 2011; Usul 2011).  
Turkey’s recognition as a EU candidate coincided with the capture of PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan that impacted directly on EU conditionality and the Kurdish 
issue. Öcalan’s capture instigated a wave of ethno-nationalism in Turkey, as 
people looked for payback after twenty years of terror that claimed the lives of 
hundreds of thousands.4 The EU institutions as well as the CoE carefully watched 
the ensuing trial of Öcalan due to the rise of nationalism and the generally weak 
status of judicial safeguards for human rights protection in Turkey. The Ankara 
State Security Court sentenced Öcalan to death in June 1999. The EU Presidency 
responded to the judgement by issuing a statement that called on Turkey to apply 
its general moratorium of death sentences also in this case (The Independent 
1999). Likewise the Commission’s progress report of the same year, whilst 
                                                           
4 The mass media in particular created an emotional e vironment of nationalism, referring to 
Öcalan frequently as ‘the baby killer’ and celebrating the trial process as the time of ‘payback.’ 
See e.g. Hürriyet, a best-selling national newspaper, announcing the start of trial with the headline 
of ‘payback day’, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=-82667>.  
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pointing out that Turkey did not fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria as yet, was closed 
with the hope that Öcalan’s death sentence would not be carried out (Commission 
1999).  
Intense monitoring of European organizations and the improvement in the 
credible commitment to Turkey’s EU membership resulted in the start of a reform 
process in Turkey. First, in June 1999 the military judge was removed from the 
State Security Courts responding to the ECtHR (European Court of Human Rights) 
judgment5 that found those courts in violation of the right to a fair trial due to 
military presence. Then, in 2001 the Turkish Parliament adopted a package of 
thirty-four constitutional and hundred and seventee other legislative amendments. 
These reforms inter alia restricted the death penalty to times of war and terrorist 
crimes and removed the reference to ‘languages prohibited’ in Arts.26 and 28 of 
the Constitution thus opening up the possibility of broadcasting in languages other 
than Turkish (Commission 2001). With the abolishment of death penalty, all 
existing death sentences at the time, including Öcalan’s, were converted to 
lifetime imprisonment. The reform process accelerated in 2002: peaceful 
expression of thought was removed from the scope of Anti-Terror Law’s Arts.7 
and 8 regarding terrorist propaganda. A constitutional amendment made retrial 
possible in cases where the ECtHR found a human rights violation. Finally, the 
Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching was amended to allow 
teaching of languages used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives, 
including Kurdish, in private courses (see Commission 2002 for all).  
Notably these far-reaching reforms were adopted by a fragile coalition between 
three political parties: the central left DSP (Democratic Left Party), the central 
right ANAP (Motherland Party) and the extreme right MHP (Nationalist Action 
Party). In addition to differences of opinion between the coalition partners on how 
to deal with the Kurdish issue, the government suffered from significant adoption 
costs: as mentioned above, nationalism peaked in Turkish society at the time and a 
large part of the public expected strict governmental policies against terror, rather 
than what was perceived to be a soft reformist approach.  
Likewise, the military at the time played a key role in Turkish politics through 
informal as well as formal platforms. For instance, the National Security Council, 
that brought together military commanders and members of the executive enjoyed 
supervisory powers over the executive.6 Historically, the Turkish military and 
bureaucratic elite had perceived the Kurdish issue as a significant security threat 
to the indivisible integrity of the state; and they r sisted any attempt for reform at 
this front (Kirişçi, Gareth 1997; Kirişçi 2011; Öniş 2003). Thus, they constituted 
                                                           
5See e.g. 41/1997/825/1031, Incal v. Turkey.  
6The military presence in and powers of the Council was limited significantly in 2003 as a part of 
another EU reform package.   
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the key and rather strong veto players. Nevertheless, the improvement in credible 
commitment that came with the recognition of Turkey’s EU candidateship helped 
the government to keep these counter-forces at bay. In 1999 the then Prime 
Minister Mesut Yılmaz metaphorically declared that ‘the road to the EU passes 
through Diyarbakır’ (the largest Kurdish populated city in Southeast Turkey). He 
thus implied that EU conditionality may provide sufficient political incentive for 
Turkey to face one of its strongest taboos: the recognition of a separate Kurdish 
identity and granting of linguistic and cultural rights to Turkish Kurds to secure 
the existence of their identity within the wider Turkish society.  
Reflecting the significance of aforementioned adoption costs, the coalition 
government soon collapsed for reasons including the difference of opinion 
between the extreme right-wing MHP and the other coaliti n parties with regard 
to the adoption of EU induced reforms. The resulting elections in November 2002 
represented a turning point in Turkish politics: established central parties, 
including the three coalition partners fell below the 10% electoral threshold. The 
MHP returned eventually to the Parliament in the 2007 and 2011 political 
elections, whereas the two other coalition partners la gely disappeared from 
Turkey’s political scene. The 2002 elections resulted in the formation of Turkey’s 
first single party government since 1987, led by the new Justice and Development 
Party (AKP). The party was formed only a year befor the elections and portrayed 
the image of a pro-EU central right party with Islamic roots. The only other party 
that succeeded in passing the 10% threshold in 2002 was the centre-left 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), thus, forming the only parliamentary 
opposition.  
Arguably as a result of its explicitly pro-EU agenda, the first AKP government 
was supported by different clusters within Turkish society as well as by liberals at 
home and abroad. Once in office the party carried on with the reform process that 
was started by the previous coalition government. Significant reforms adopted by 
the first AKP government include: the lifting of the emergency rule in all 
provinces; further amendments in procedural law to all w retrials in cases where 
the ECtHR had found violations (resulting in the release of imprisoned Kurdish 
parliamentarians Zana, Sadak, Dicle and Doğan – but still not allowing retrial of 
Öcalan); repeal of Art.8 of the Anti-Terror Law with regard to terrorist 
propaganda; the complete abolishment of the State Security Courts; amendments 
to the Civil Registry Law to allow parents to name th ir children as they desire; 
further implementation of the Return to Village Program adopted by the previous 
government to address the situation of internally displaced persons; constitutional 
amendments to reflect the primacy of international law over national law, 
including the European Convention on Human Rights; further amendments in 
secondary legislation that resulted in the start of public TV broadcasting in the 
Zaza and Kırmançi dialects of Kurdish; and the adoption of the Law on the 
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Compensation of Damages that Occurred due to Terror and the Fight Against 
Terrorism (European Commission 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005). Following this long 
list of legal reforms, and underlining the tit-for-tat character of conditionality, the 
European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004. 
The Council based its decision on a positive assessm nt by the European 
Commission, which, following the aforementioned refo ms, confirmed that 
Turkey now fulfilled the Copenhagen political critea (European Council 2004).   
Still, these reforms represented only limited progress from the perspectives of 
cultural and minority rights trictu sensu, as they in fact improved the daily lives 
of Kurdish Turks only marginally. Still, the emergency rule was lifted and the 
public broadcasting and private education courses wre offered for the first time 
in Kurdish. The lifting of emergency rule meant that citizens residing in Southeast 
Turkey would enjoy the same legal safeguards against the violation of their 
fundamental rights by the state authorities as those re iding in the rest of the 
country. The public broadcasting and private training n Kurdish, on the other 
hand, meant that the Turkish state officially abandoned its denial policy regarding 
the language. However, the implementing legislation in both areas brought strict 
conditions rendering particularly private broadcasting in Kurdish extremely 
difficult; and those who secured licence to broadcast f ced investigations on the 
basis of terror-related crimes due to programme content (TESEV 2008; 2009; 
Kurban 2003; European Commission 2003; 2004; 2005). Crucially, Turkey did 
not take many other reform steps considered necessary by the Commission to 
improve the situation of Kurdish Turks (European Commission 2003; 2004; 2005; 
2006). For instance, the unusually high 10% national electoral threshold7 was not 
lowered although it arguably prevents the fair representation of different clusters 
of society, including the Kurds.8 Also, the government did not amend the Law on 
Political Parties to allow the use of languages other than Turkish by political 
parties. The government’s implementation remained slow, inconsistent and often 
unsatisfactory with regard to the situation of inter ally displaced persons and the 
compensation of terror victims. Moreover, state authori ies did not engage in 
dialogue with the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities despite the 
repeated calls of the European Commission and the 2003 and 2005 visits of the 
Commissioner to Turkey. Turkey did not sign either the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities nor the European Charter for Regional 
and Minority Languages. The International Convenants on Civil and Political 
Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were ratified with reservations 
                                                           
7Highest among CoE members. 
8 In Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey(Application No. 10226/03) the ECtHR decided that the hreshold 
does not breach the right to free elections; nevertheless, it prevents optimal representation, thus, 




on provisions regarding minority rights. No amendment was made to Art.42 of the 
Constitution that prevents public education in langua es other than Turkish. No 
reform steps were taken for the provision of public services in the languages and 
dialects spoken predominantly in the region and for the decentralization of the 
provision of public services. Also, the village guards system, that effectively 
creates local militia against PKK attacks, thus, reulting in serious human rights 
violations, was not abandoned. Finally, public prosecutors and the judiciary 
continued to apply terror-related provisions of theCriminal Code and the Anti-
Terror Law to peaceful expression of thought, demonstrating explicitly that the 
legal reforms had failed to engender a mentality transformation in public officials.  
Since then, the European Commission has noted that Turkey has still not adopted 
an ‘integrated strategy’ to address the Kurdish question from legal, economic and 
social angles (European Commission 2004, p.19). Particularly, the still rigid state 
policy against the usage of languages other than Turkish has jeopardised effective 
access to public education, other public services and political life particularly in 
Southeast Turkey where an estimated half of the population does not speak 
Turkish (International Crisis Group 2011, p.22).Nevertheless, as limited as the 
initial reforms may have been, they were still well received by the Kurdish 
community. To them they signified the recognition of their identity by the Turkish 
State after many decades of denial and suppression and they were hoped to be the 
harbingers of a brighter future (Bahçeli, Noel 2011).   
 
Stagnation in accession talks and the Kurdish issue: Copenhagen Criteria v. 
Ankara Criteria 
The dynamics in Turkey’s EU accession changed dramatically after Cyprus 
became an EU Member as a divided island in May 2004. Turkey refused to extend 
the Turkish-EU customs union to Cyprus by fully implementing the Additional 
Protocol to the Turkish-EU Association Agreement. Ankara indicated it would 
only reverse its position on this issue if the economic isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriot community in the north were adequately addressed. The EU perceived the 
extension of the customs union a legal obligation fr Turkey regardless of the 
situation of Turkish Cypriots (European Commission 2006). As a result, in 2006 
the European Council decided that accession negotiations with Turkey will not be 
opened in eight Chapters relevant to Turkey’s trade restrictions to the Republic of 
Cyprus; namely, the chapters on free movement of gods, right of establishment 
and the freedom to provide services, financial servic s, agriculture and rural 
development, fisheries, transport policy, customs union and external relations 
(European Council, 2006b). As these chapters constitute the bulk of the EU’s 
acquis communautaire, the Council’s decision meant that accession negotiati ns 
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would continue only in limited areas thereby effectively ruling out Turkey’s 
membership for the foreseeable future. Thus, regardless of whether the decision 
was justified, it constituted a clear impediment to the Union’s credible 
commitment toward Turkish membership. Additionally, some EU Member States, 
most notably Germany, France, Austria and Netherlands, had become increasingly 
sceptical of Turkey’s accession. For instance they ave signalled that Turkey’s 
future EU accession may be subjected to national referendums (Ellis 2010). In 
addition to these impediments to credible commitment, the Greek Cypriot 
government now holds a veto on Turkey’s EU membership, potentially adding on 
another hurdle to Turkey’s future accession.  
The stagnation in Turkish-EU relations raised fears of an imminent roll-back of 
political reforms in Turkey to the status quo ante. Yet, Prime Minister Erdoğan 
declared that if necessary the Turkish Government would rename the Copenhagen 
Criteria as the ‘Ankara Criteria’ and continue with the reform process (AB Haber 
2006). However, with the decline in credible commitment, the government’s 
approach toward the Kurdish minority as well as other elements of democratic 
reform began to be determined less by EU conditionality nd more by domestic 
incentives and internal cost-benefit structures. Starting in 2006, the Commission’s 
progress reports pointed to the government’s failure to continue the reform 
process. In the reports the Commission bemoaned especially the implementation 
problems regarding already adopted legal reforms as well as the increase in 
tensions and hostilities between different political groups. The Commission saw 
the latter as a key hurdle to creating a domestic political environment that is 
conducive to(if not imperative for) successful and sustainable reforms within 
Turkey (European Commission 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2 10; 2011). 
The AKP won the 2007 general elections to form a single party government for 
the second term. Yet, in the 2009 local elections the party lost out to the Kurdish 
DTP (Democratic Society Party) in eight key southeast provinces. Commentators 
argued that this success was a response by the Kurdish electorate to the 
government’s stagnating reform agenda, especially in the area of Kurdish 
minority and cultural rights (Çarkoğlu 2010). Following the local elections and 
keen to re-establish its popularity in the Kurdish-populated region, the AKP 
government proposed a so-called ‘Kurdish opening’. Notwithstanding the 
promising name, the government failed to release any details of what this new 
initiative would stand for, rendering it open to criti ism from both Turkish and 
Kurdish nationalists. The first step of the ‘Kurdish opening’ was taken finally in 
November 2009 when 34 PKK members were officially aowed to enter Turkey 
from their Iraqi bases (Radikal 2009). This initial gesture was celebrated widely 
by the Kurdish nationalists as a victory against the Turkish State thus attracting 
the fury of Turkish nationalists. As a result, the government renamed the ‘Kurdish 
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Opening’ as the ‘Democratic Opening’ and later as the ‘National Unity Plan’ and 
soon after abandoned it completely (Habertürk 2009). 
The failure of the Kurdish opening was subject to extensive debate with the 
consensus emerging that the AKP government at the tim lacked a clear and 
comprehensive strategy in their approach towards the Kurdish minority. The 
government could have relied on the politically less contentious discourse of EU 
conditionality, as had been done before, thus, keeping the extreme Turkish and 
Kurdish nationalists at bay. Instead, the government attempted a quick fix to bring 
swift results and to reverse its drop in popularity in the southeast, which 
eventually backfired (Kirişçi 2011; Casier et. al. 2011; Çiçek 2011; International 
Crisis Group 2011).Notably, the government’s Kurdish initiative was launched in 
parallel to Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) criminal investigations 
where more than 2000 Kurdish politicians and intellectuals, as well as members of 
the press, have been arrested since 2009 for being PKK members – mostly based 
on non-violent expressions of thought (International Crisis Group 2011). Those 
under arrest include elected local politicians from the DTP and the Peace and 
Democracy Party (BDP). The latter was established in December 2009 to replace 
the DTP after the Turkish Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the 
latter.9 
In the run-up to the 2011 general elections the political climate became 
increasingly more hostile. The AKP government abandone  its previous reformist 
path; instead relying on an increasingly nationalist tone. This tactic was arguably 
employed to steal the MHP’s main electoral base and push the party below the 10% 
threshold (Cengiz and Hoffmann 2012).10For instance, in election rallies, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan accused the MHP for not ‘hanging’ Öcalan, referring to MHP’s 
partnership to the coalition government that had abolished the death penalty 
(Turkish Daily News 2011). In its approach to the Kurdish issue the AKP relied on 
the so-called ‘muslim brotherhood’ discourse (Milliyet 2011). This discourse, 
originally used by Islamist parties in the 1990s, relies on the promotion of a 
unifying umbrella identity of Islam for different ethnic groups, including the 
Kurds, thus leaving minimum need for the promotion f separate ethnic 
identities(Houston 2001). Most significantly, the Prime Minister Erdoğan refused 
in the election campaign to acknowledge the existence of a Kurdish problem in 
Turkey, advocating instead that there was a terror issue caused by the PKK and 
other extremist Kurds (Habertürk 2011). 
                                                           
9Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey, decision no 2009/4.  
10 If the MHP had failed to reach the 10% national thres old, the AKP would have been all but 
guaranteed a two-third majority of parliamentary seat , necessary to amend the constitution 
singlehandedly. This was AKP’s main goal in the elections. See AKP 2011, pp. 15-17.  
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Unsurprisingly, the Kurdish electorate was not swayed by the reliance on religious 
and anti-terror arguments in the AKP’s election camp ign. The AKP received 49% 
of the overall vote. It thereby achieved its largest share of the popular vote yet and 
won a third term in the office. However, the Kurdish BDP emerged as another 
winner in the elections. To circumvent the 10% thres old the party decided to 
field independent candidates, rather than a party list. As a result the BDP secured 
36 seats in the parliament –almost double its previous parliamentary 
representation. The post-election period was marred by a deterioration in the 
political climate, as some MPs of the BDP had been arrested due to terror-related 
criminal accusations mostly under the aforementioned KCK operation. Thus, 
those MPs could not take their seats in the parliament. The only criminally 
convicted MP among those was Hatip Dicle, whose parliamentary mandate was 
stripped by the High Election Council.11His seat was subsequently reallocated to 
the second placed AKP candidate in the Diyarbakir constituency. The BDP called 
on the AKP government to amend relevant constitutional and criminal provisions 
to remove non-directly-terror-related expression of thought from the scope of 
terror-related crimes, which would have led to the immediate release of all elected 
BDP members. In order to pressure the government to ad pt the requested 
reforms, BDP MPs initially boycotted en banc all parliamentary activities. 
The AKP refused to take the necessary reform steps r sulting in an even more 
politically hostile environment (Cengiz, Hoffmann 2011). On 14 July 2011, just 
over a month after the elections, violence resurged in Turkey’s southeast. The 
PKK ended its pre-election ceasefire and killed 13 Turkish soldiers at once in an 
ambush in Silvan. This was followed by more attacks against military and civilian 
targets. The government, in response, intensified the military fight with cross-
border air raids on PKK camps in Northern Iraq (CNNTürk 2011). The violence 
that started in the summer of 2011 has not yet stopped and has claimed the lives of 
hundreds of soldiers and civilians so far.  
The dramatic shift in the government’s approach to the Kurdish issue came into 
place despite various developments that resulted in sig ificant and continuous 
decrease in the adoption costs for reform. First and foremost, the AKP did not 
only win three national elections in a row to the end of forming a single party 
government, but the party also enjoyed a steady increase in its share of the vote 
from one election to the other. In other words, unlike previous fragile coalition 
governments, the AKP enjoys sustained public support that ought to propel the 
party to take bold reform steps in politically conte tious issues, such as minority 
rights, without fearing to lose nationalist votes or to face a governmental collapse.  
                                                           
11Decision No.1022, June 21, 2011. 
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Second, the Turkish military and bureaucratic elites, who had previously 
constituted key veto players in the domestic political system, have lost most of 
their powers to civilian political institutions. Interestingly, this loss in power was a 
direct result of the democratic reforms adopted responding to EU conditionality. 
Removal of informal and formal military involvement i  daily political life has 
been made a condition in Turkey’s accession partnerships (European Council 
2001; 2003; 2006a; 2008). And the Turkish governments adopted significant 
reforms between the years 2002 and 2010 to meet these EU 
conditions.12 Additionally, in 2007 and 2010 two criminal investigations, 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer, were launched into alleged coup and other illegal 
propaganda activities against the government by military and other state personnel. 
Initially, the Ergenekon investigation was also hoped to illuminate and provide 
retribution for grave human rights violations committed in the southeast 
throughout the 1990s by the so-called Turkish ‘deep state’ (i.e. a criminal 
organization within the state apparatus using illegal methods in the fight against 
terror). Nevertheless, the investigation increasingly lost its credibility with the 
release of 15 different indictments targeting journalists and otherwise 
government-critical individuals. Thus, the investiga on is now often perceived as 
a political attempt by the government to punish its opponents (Mavioğlu, Şık 
2010). Illustrating the shift in the balance of power between the military and 
civilian institutions, former force commanders as well as the former chief of staff 
who had been appointed by the second AKP government have also been arrested 
under the Ergenekon investigation. The shift in the balance of power was not only 
legal but also symbolic: notably, as a response to the military opposition to 
Abdullah Gül’s election as the president of the country AKP called early elections 
in 2007 and won its second term in the office proving that the public takes side 
with the government rather than the military (BBC News 2007). Likewise, in 2011, 
the civilian members of the High Military Council (that appoints officers to key 
military positions) exercised full discretion over the choice of force commanders, 
after a conflict between the civil and military members of the Council resulting in 
the resignation of all existing force commanders (Cumhuriyet 2011). 
In summary, in its second and third terms in office the AKP government 
responded to EU conditionality only selectively. The government strategically 
adopted the reforms that would result in the increase of civilian, hence 
governmental, powers at the expense of the powers of significant veto players in 
                                                           
12The most important reforms in this respect include the changing of the majority of membership 
in the National Security Council to the benefit of civil executives and the stripping of the Council 
from all non-advisory powers; opening of the execution of military budget to full civilian control; 
the removal of the military courts’ jurisdiction for the trial of civilians; the removal of military 
membership from all advisory state boards; and the abolishment of the Protocol on Cooperation 
for Security and Public Order (the EMASYA Protocol) that enabled military operations without 
due civilian authorization in cases of emergency. See Gürsoy 2011. 
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the state system, most notably the military. Although the limitation of veto players 
constituted a reduction in adoption costs, it did not automatically translate into an 
improvement or acceleration in the reform process with regard to other issues. On 
the contrary, in the absence of credible commitment to Turkish EU membership, 
domestic cost-benefit structures, rather than EU conditionality, determined the 
AKP government’s incentives for reform. Arguably, the AKP increasingly 
perceived the Kurdish BDP as a political rival not only in the southeast, but also 
in certain metropolitan areas, thus, carefully avoiding to take any reform steps that 
could appear as victories of the BDP and the rest of he Kurdish political 
establishment. Additionally, in the lack of a credible commitment for Turkey’s 
EU membership, the original belief system of the government party, rather than 
norms promoted by the EU, began to influence the government’s domestic reform 
agenda. Put differently, the AKP – essentially a centre-right party – did not hold a 
strong enough belief in the existence and promotion of Kurdish identity nor did it 
agree that this identity is in need of protection and promotion through cultural and 
social minority rights (Çiçek 2011).  
 
Conclusions: Implications for Europeanization and the External Incentives 
Model  
In the context of Turkish reforms with regard to the Kurdish minority, our 
analysis shows that credible commitment appears as a necessary and sufficient 
condition for norm adoption, whereas low adoption costs appear neither as 
necessary nor sufficient condition. A fragile coalition government initiated daring 
reforms in the presence of credible EU commitment to Turkey’s accession despite 
high adoption costs and powerful veto players in the domestic political system. In 
contrast, a powerful three term incumbent government r turned to a much more 
conservative and nationalistic discourse responding to decline in credible 
commitment. This was despite the decreasing adoption costs and the loss of power 
of significant veto players. This finding contradicts the basic premises of the 
external incentives model. The model perceives low adoption costs and weak veto 
players as necessary and sufficient conditions for norm adoption in EU candidates.  
Additionally, the external incentives model seems to have missed to a degree the 
dynamic nature of the accession process. As our analysis shows, EU induced 
democratic reforms may result in a progressive decrease in adoption costs and in 
the power of the veto players. This requires a more dynamic treatment of the 
relationship between EU conditionality and adoption c sts in the model. Currently 
the model treats adoption costs and veto players as independent exogenous 
variables for norm adoption, even though the reforms themselves may influence 
adoption costs and the power of veto players. From this perspective our analysis 
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also reveals a potential side effect of conditionality: in the absence of credible 
commitment, those in power in EU candidates may apply conditionality 
selectively and strategically to increase their own power in the system. A selective 
adoption of EU proposed reforms might not always lead in the direction of a more 
democratic regime. In the Turkish example the government applied conditionality 
selectively to increase governmental powers at the expense of key veto players, 
most notably the military. It is beyond doubt that civilian oversight of the military 
constitutes a key element of a democratic regime. Still, in the Turkish case the 
decline in the powers of veto players did not directly result in a more democratic 
regime. On the contrary, there are signs of civil – as opposed to military – 
authoritarianism in the system that is apparent inter alia in the government’s 
approach to the Kurdish issue. This finding is in line with the initial arguments of 
some critics that conditionality might tip the power balance towards governments 
who hold the primary access to the reform agenda(See Vink, Graziano 2008, p.15).   
As has become clear throughout our paper, a formal adoption of norms does not 
necessarily result in compliance with the EU standards. Effective implementation 
of EU induced reforms requires a more fundamental mentality transformation on 
the side of the state institutions and officials. When underlying belief systems 
remain intact, institutions and officials find alternative routes to return to the 
status quo ante once the effect of conditionality weakens or vanishes, despite the 
changes in legal framework. For instance, in the Turkish case various 
amendments to the Anti-Terror Law and the Criminal Code did not prevent state 
institutions and officials from treating the expression of taught as terrorist 
propaganda under alternative criminal provisions at the expense of freedom of 
expression. As a side effect, strong EU conditionality may contribute to the lack 
of mentality transformation: reforms determined as short- and medium-term 
conditions in accession partnerships often take over th  parliamentary agenda. 
Large numbers of legislative reforms are adopted in extremely short periods of 
time, leaving no room for public debate necessary for the internalisation of 
reforms (See also Schimmelfenning, Sedelemeier 2008, p.26). In the Turkish case, 
in 2001 alone thirty-four constitutional and hundred and seventeen other 
legislative amendments were adopted. Moreover, the first AKP government 
passed the reforms in full partnership with the CHP, the only opposition party in 
Parliament at the time, thus leaving no room for debat  and/or alternative voices 
in the parliament. The potential return to the status quo ante is also alarming for 
long-term compliance with EU standards in the new Member States. Even though 
recent empirical studies discredit the reason for ala m, their analysis is purely 
based on implementation of directives and the Commission’s infringement 
proceedings. Nevertheless, as the recent developments in Hungary demonstrate, a 
significant power shift in the domestic political system may pose long term 
problems for the relevant country as well as the Union as a whole (see Mueller 
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2011). Hence, methods based on social interaction, such as networking and civil 
society mobilisation, rather than pure conditionality, may prove more effective in 
securing long-term compliance with norms that are contested in the domestic 
belief system.  
These conclusions are subject to the caveat that they are produced by the analysis 
of a single case study: democratic reforms regarding the Kurdish minority in 
Turkey. We appreciate the necessity to verify our arguments by a wider, 
comparative analysis to show whether these conclusions have general relevance or 
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